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基于进化博弈的农户储备粮食行为研究
刘畅, 侯云先
0
(中国农业大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100083)
摘要:
针对多年来我国农户粮食储备量连续下降的问题,以及农户群体储粮行为常表现出的“共振效应”现象,利用进化博弈分析方法,对农户群体粮食储备行为进行研究。结果表明:1)农户群体的储粮行为存在3个进化稳定策略。2)在预期粮价与粮食产储成本满足一定关系时,农户群体粮食储备行为常表现出趋同性,出现“共振效应”。3)可以通过调整未来预期粮价与改变农户粮食产储成本的方式,影响农户群体的粮食储备策略,进而将农户群体的储粮行为保持在可调控的合理状态。
关键词:  农户  储粮  进化博弈  进化稳定策略
DOI:10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2017.03.20
投稿时间:2016-04-02
基金项目:国家社会科学基金(14BGL062);“十二五”国家科技支撑计划(2014BAL07B05)
Research on the grain storage of farm household based on the evolutionary game theory
LIU Chang, HOU Yunxian
(College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China)
Abstract:
For many years the grain storage of farm household continuously decreased,and the "resonance effect" often occurs in the storage behavior of farmers.To solve these problems,the evolutionary game theory methods is adopted to study the grain storage of farm household.The results show that:The grain storage of farmers groups has three evolutionary stable strategies.When the grain prices expected in the future and the costs of grain production and storage satisfy a certain relation,farm household's behavior often exhibit homoplasy and the resonance effect.The government also can influence the farm household's grain storage strategy by affecting the grain prices expected in the future and change the farmer grain production and storage cost.It will help the government keep the storage behavior of farm household adjustable.
Key words:  farm household  grain storage  evolutionary game  evolutionary stable strategy