基于演化博弈的原料奶供应链质量协同控制机制
投稿时间:2019-03-27    点此下载全文
引用本文:吴强,张园园,孙世民.基于演化博弈的原料奶供应链质量协同控制机制[J].中国农业大学学报,2020,25(2):223-234
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作者单位E-mail
吴强 山东农业大学 经济管理学院, 山东 泰安 271018 784890651@qq.com 
张园园 山东农业大学 经济管理学院, 山东 泰安 271018  
孙世民 山东农业大学 经济管理学院, 山东 泰安 271018 smsun@sdau.edu.cn 
基金项目:国家社会科学基金资助项目(15BGL136);山东农业大学双一流学科建设专项资金项目(SYL2017XTTD16)
中文摘要:基于市场失灵与政府干预相结合的视角,运用演化博弈模型分析了乳品供应链中奶农和乳品加工企业质量协同控制的实现条件,并运用相关数据验证了模型的适用性与结论的准确性。研究表明:低收益率与高溢出率均会导致市场失灵。当奶农采取高级预防策略和乳品加工企业采取高级检验策略收益率较低时,(基本预防,基本检验)将是双方的最优质量控制策略组合,此时,政府应给予采取高级控制策略方足够的补贴,以激励双方共同保障乳品质量;当奶农采取高级预防策略或乳品加工企业采取高级检验策略收益率提高,但溢出率较高时,另一方将采取“搭便车”行为,则(高级预防,基本检验)或(基本预防,高级检验)将是双方的最优策略组合,此时,政府应该加大处罚力度,迫使“搭便车”行为者进行质量协同控制。仿真结果进一步表明政府补贴对奶农的效用更为明显,政府惩罚具有“正强化”和“负强化”双重作用。
中文关键词:供应链管理  质量预防  质量检验  协同控制  仿真模拟
 
Quality cooperative control mechanism of dairy supply chain based on evolutionary gameWU Qiang, ZHANG Yuanyuan, SUN Shimin*
Abstract:Based on the evolutionary game model, the quality control mechanism of dairy farmers and dairy processing enterprises in the dairy supply chain from the point of view of market failure and government intervention are investigated. The applicability of model and accuracy to results are verified by the related data. The results show that: Low yield and high overflow rate can lead to market failure. When dairy farmers adopt the advanced prevention strategies or dairy processing companies adopt the advanced inspection strategies, the basic prevention and basic inspection will be the optimal quality control strategy combination of both parties. At this time, the government should give sufficient subsidies to adopt advanced control strategies to encourage both sides to jointly ensure the quality of dairy products. When the dairy farmer adopts the advanced prevention strategies or dairy processing company adopts the advanced inspection strategy to increase the yield, but the overflow rate is higher, the other party will adopt the “free-rider” behavior, then the advanced prevention and basic inspection or the basic prevention and advanced inspection will be the optimal combination of strategies for both sides. At this time, the government should increase its penalties and force “free-rider” actors to conduct quality control. In conclusion, the government subsidies are more effective to dairy farmers, and the government penalty has the double effect of “positive reinforcement” and “negative reinforcement”.
keywords:supply chain management  quality prevention  quality inspection  synergy mechanisms  simulation
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