| 摘要: |
| 为构建演化博弈模型，分析地方政府与社会投资者在土地整治PPP模式中的演化路径，对南京B街道土地整治项目中地方政府与社会投资者的演化博弈进行研究。结果表明：在社会投资者期望收益r小于机会成本b时，地方政府的扶持可以提高社会投资者参与项目的积极性。随着土地整治PPP模式给地方政府和社会投资者带来的收益不断增加，地方政府的最优策略选择是扶持社会投资者、社会投资者的最优策略是参与PPP模式；在南京B街道土地整治项目中，社会投资者期望收益r大于机会成本b，社会投资者能稳定趋向参与土地整治PPP模式，地方政府对社会投资者的扶持力度受自身收益影响，当地方政府的收益越来越小时，扶持的力度会逐渐下降。为进一步提高提高社会投资者参与土地整治PPP模式的积极性，加快构建土地整治PPP模式市场，提出建立土地整治PPP模式激励机制，建立土地整治PPP模式的反向约束机制2个措施。 |
| 关键词: 土地整治 PPP模式 演化博弈 项目融资 |
| DOI：10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2017.07.019 |
| 投稿时间：2016-08-01 |
| 基金项目:国家社会科学基金项目（10BJY040） |
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| Research on Evolutionary Game between government and social investors in the land consolidation and readjustment PPP model |
|
CHEN Hui1, AN Chunxiao2, FU Guanghui2, LIU Youzhao1, FENG Jiajia3
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| (1.College of Public Administration, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China;2.College of Civil Engineering, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211816, China;3.Nanjing Institute of Water-Resources Planning and Designing Co., Ltd., Nanjing 210006, China) |
| Abstract: |
| In order to promote social investors' enthusiasm in land consolidation-PPP model,this paper analyzed the features of game behavior in the mode between local governments and social investors are analyzed.An Evolutionary Game model is established to analyze the game behavior features of local governments and social investors' evolution paths in land consolidation-PPP Mode,and to study a land consolidation project of B Street in Nanjing.If social investors' expected revenue is less than their opportunity cost,local governments' fostering will stimulate investors' motivation to take part in the PPP project.It is found that,the revenue,which is brought to local government and social investors,increases continuously by the project.The optimal strategy for governments is to help social investors' to engaging in the PPP project,and for investors to join it actively.In the land consolidation project of B Street,when social investors' expected revenue is more than their opportunity cost,all of them steadily tend to engage the project.The support for social investors depends on local governments' income.When the income decreases,the support will fall.Two suggestions are put forwarded to further promote social investors' positivity in the mode,and speed up construction of land consolidation-PPP Mode market:One is to set up an incentive mechanism of land consolidation PPP project to complete local governments' performance appraisal mechanism.The other is to establish reverse constraint mechanism of the land consolidation PPP project. |
| Key words: land consolidation and readjustment public-private partnerships evolutionary game theory project financing land credit |
