| 摘要: |
| 通过建立以核心企业为主导的食品供应链内上游供应商与下游核心企业的动态博弈模型，分析不同条件下各企业共享追溯信息的行为选择，在此基础上探讨促使供应链内各企业参与信息共享的边界条件与方式。结果表明：1）核心企业参与信息共享与消费者的食品安全意识和安全食品支付意愿强度有关；2）由核心企业牵头可以带动供应链上的其他中小企业参与追溯信息共享；3）供应链的食品安全水平越高，消费者越偏好于可追溯食品，企业的信息发送成本越低，则核心企业和上游供应商的追溯信息发送量越大，收益越高；4）集中决策下的供应链整体优于核心企业主导的供应链。因此，应降低企业信息发送成本，提升质量控制能力，推动企业参与食品可追溯信息共享。 |
| 关键词: 食品 可追溯信息 参与意愿 信息共享 动态博弈 |
| DOI：10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2017.03.22 |
| 投稿时间：2016-05-17 |
| 基金项目:国家“十二五”科技支撑计划项目（2014BAL07B05）；国家现代农业产业技术体系建设专项（CARS-30）；教育部人文社科项目（13YJCZH182） |
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| Mechanism of enterprises sharing food traceability information |
|
WANG Ruimei, DENG Lei, WU Tianzhen, SONG Huan, ZHANG Xiling
|
| (College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China) |
| Abstract: |
| The optimal response of core and downstream enterprises to sharing food traceability information with different assumptions is analyzed using dynamic game theory.The aim of this study is to investigate when and why the core and downstream enterprises are willing to share information in food traceability system dominated by core enterprises.The results show that:1) The willingness of core enterprises to share information is related to the awareness on food safety and willingness to pay for safe food of consumers;2) The willingness of small and middle enterprises to share food traceability information is affected by core enterprises;3) The higher level of food safety and lower cost of enterprises to share information,the more information shared by core and upstream enterprises will be and more profit will be created;4) A centralized food supply chain is better than that dominated by core enterprises.In conclusion,it is important to decrease the cost of information sharing and improve the ability of food quality control to encourage enterprises to share food traceability information. |
| Key words: food traceability information willingness information sharing dynamic game |
