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基于委托代理理论的果蔬供应链风险分担模型
李滢棠1,2, 乔忠1
0
(1.中国农业大学 经济管理学院, 北京 100083;2.集美大学 航海学院, 福建 厦门 361021)
摘要:
针对果蔬供应链中,供应链成员缺乏真实传递果蔬质量和新鲜度等相关信息的意愿,使得供应链出现信息不对称现象,造成供应链下游成员承担绝大部分风险等问题,利用委托代理理论,以农户和超市组成的二级供应链为研究对象,构建引入风险分担度r的果蔬供应链风险分担模型,形成考虑农户风险分担努力因素的委托代理契约,与原有契约进行比较,结果表明:考虑农户风险分担努力因素的委托代理契约使农户收益增加,风险降低。建议农户应加强与超市的信息沟通,主动为分担风险做出努力,使供应链效益最大化。
关键词:  果蔬供应链  委托代理  信息不对称  风险分担
DOI:10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2014.03.31
投稿时间:2013-11-21
基金项目:中国农业大学研究生科研创新专项基金项目(2013YJ011)
Risk sharing model of fruit and vegetable supply chain based on principal-agent theory
LI Ying-tang1,2, QIAO Zhong1
(1.College of Economics and Management, China Agricultural University, Beijing 100083, China;2.College of Navigation, Jimei University, Xiamen 361021, China)
Abstract:
The members of fruit and vegetable supply chain usually have little willingness to transfer real information about quality, freshness and other related information of their products.This will lead to information asymmetry.Then the members of downstream supply chain have to bear most of the risk.In view of the above unreasonable fact, this paper chose farming-supermarket docking supply chain as research subject and established the risk-sharing model of fruit and vegetable supply chain based on the principal-agent theory.This model contained variable r which meant the degree of risk-sharing effort.Based on this model, the farmer and the supermarket would form a principal-agent contract which took the factor of the farmer's risk-sharing effort into consideration.Comparing this contract with the original contract, this paper drew the conclusion that the new contract would increase the farmer's income and reduce the farmer's risk.The new contract was more reasonable.So the farmer is suggested to transfer more information to the supermarket and share the risk for maximizing the benefit of the supply chain.
Key words:  fruit and vegetable supply chain  principal-agent  information asymmetry  risk sharing