| 摘要: |
| 通过实际调研和文献分析,在对我国秸秆禁烧的政府监管分为严厉惩罚和奖惩激励2种模式的基础上,采用静态纳什均衡博弈方法分析政府监管不同模式下,农户与政府2个主要利益主体的策略选择及其效果。结果表明:采取激励型政策措施引导农户综合利用秸秆资源,是当前政府在监管秸秆焚烧措施中比较有效的方式,但这一激励政策发挥作用的基本约束条件是,政府的激励措施应能弥补农户处置秸秆所带来的成本损失。 |
| 关键词: 秸秆焚烧 监管模式 静态博弈 成本收益 |
| DOI：10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2009.04.096 |
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| 基金项目:引进国际先进农业科学技术项目(2006-G60);;中国农业大学-南京农业大学青年科研合作基金项目(CAU-NAU2007004) |
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| Abstract: |
| The government has released a series of no-burning policy,however little effect has been gained.In view of the issue of farmers burning straw,Different government regulation models were analyzed and the static game model was introduced to do some comparative analysis on the farmers' burning straw and the effect of government regulations.It showed that the incentive-based regulation is an effective way for the government to supervise the burning of straw.However,the function displayed by the mode of incentiv... |
| Key words: straw burning supervised mode static games cost-benefit analysis |
