| 摘要: |
| 在分析高档猪肉供应链中公司与养猪场行为选择机理的基础上，利用监督博弈模型导出了双方行为选择的临界条件。重点从风险抵押金、降价收购、延期收购和“冷酷战略”4方面分析了违约惩罚对养猪场行为选择的作用及行为选择的影响因素。研究结果表明，养猪场的饲养规模和高档猪肉与普通猪肉的价格差是影响养猪场行为选择的关键因素；以大城市高收入理性消费者为目标客户、大型猪肉加工企业为核心组建供应链，实施基于产品差异化的市场集中战略，是改善养猪场行为的重要途径。 |
| 关键词: 高档猪肉供应链 加工企业 养猪场 败德行为 监督行为 监督博弈 |
| DOI：10.11841/j.issn.1007-4333.2003.02.053 |
| 修订日期：2002-10-07 |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 2 710 5 7)，国家自然科学基金重点资助项目 ( 70 13 3 0 0 1) |
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| Study on the behaviors of company and pig farm in high quality pork supply chain |
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| Abstract: |
| The mechanism of behavior selection of company and pig farm in high quality pork supply chain was analyzed, and the critical condition of behavior selection of them was obtained by using supervise game model. From the fields of risk mortgage, cheap purchasing, deferred purchasing, and grim strategy, the effects of punishment on the behavior selection of pig farm were studied. It was showed that breeding scale and the price difference of pork were the key factors effecting on the behavior selection. Facing high earning rational consumer, and creating pork supply chain by large pork processing enterprise, and actualizing market collection strategy based on the production difference will be the important approach to improve the behavior of pig farm. |
| Key words: high quality pork,risk behavior,supervise behavior,supervise game |
